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INTRODUCTION
Since 2000, Zimbabwe has embarked upon a controversial fasttrack land reform program to redistribute large commercial farms
mostly owned by white farmers to landless black Zimbabweans who
were dispossessed during colonialism.1 Today, the program
1. See Blair Rutherford, The Rough Contours of Land Reform in Zimbabwe,
29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103-05 (2005) (reporting that in the first five years
of the land reform program, Zimbabwe acquired 5,890 commercial farms and
slated them for resettlement for landless beneficiaries); cf. Hasani Claxton, Land
and Liberation: Lessons for the Creation of Effective Land Reform Policy in South
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continues to spark controversy and violence against white
landowners.2 On October 26, 2010, Kobus Jobert became another
victim of the chaotic land reform program, when his wife was
assaulted and he was murdered in his home by a gang, after his home
was identified for redistribution.3 In spite of the violence resulting
from the land reform program, individual blacks own no more land
today than they did during the colonial period.4
This comment explores the reasons why Amendments 16A and
16B of the Zimbabwean Constitution, which authorize fast-track land
reform, violate minimum international standards regarding the right
to property and due process.5 Part I will explain how Zimbabwe’s
colonial history has led to its current drastic land reform policy. 6 It
Africa, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 529, 544 (2003) (stressing that land reform,
implemented fairly, may be one of the most effective ways to ease economic
disparities and racial tensions for future generations).
2. See Leah Hyslop, White Farmers in Zimbabwe Struggle against Increasing
Violence, THE TELEGRAPH (June 11, 2010), http://www. telegraph.co.uk/expat/
expatnews/7818110/White-farmers-in-Zimbabwe-struggle-against-increasingviolence.html (reporting an increase in arrests and land seizures by local
government activists in mid-2010). But see Andrew Hartnack, Transcending
Global and National (Mis)representations Through Local Responses to
Displacement: The Case of Zimbabwean (Ex-)Farm Workers, 22 J. REFUGEE
STUD. 351, 363-64 (2009) (revealing that more blacks who work on white-owned
commercial farms have been killed and beaten than white farmers, but their plight
has been far less publicized).
3. See Tererai Karimakwenda, White Commercial Farmer Shot and Killed in
Chegutu, SW RADIO AFRICA (Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.swradioafrica.
com/news271010/whitecom271010.htm (elaborating that the 67-year-old white
farmer was shot in the head, and US$10,000 was stolen from his home); see also
Lebo Nkatazo, Two Held over Farmer’s Murder, NEW ZIMBABWE.COM (Nov. 24,
2010), http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news/printVersion.aspx?newsID =3884
(explaining that the Commercial Farmers Union is hesitating to claim a political
motivation behind Jobert’s murder).
4. See Thomas W. Mitchell, The Land Crisis in Zimbabwe: Getting Beyond
the Myopic Focus upon Black & White, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 587, 593
(2001) (arguing that despite efforts to reverse the effects of colonial laws that
barred blacks from buying land, the government has resisted distributing any
ownership rights, and has instead issued non-freehold tenure and leases.
5. See discussion infra Parts III-IV (arguing the numerous international law
standards that Amendments 16A and 16B contradict, including the prohibition on
racial discrimination, arbitrary deprivation of property, denial of fair
compensation, and inability to access courts).
6. See discussion infra Part I.A (explaining that Zimbabwe has taken extreme
measures to reach its land reform goals, which has, in turn, caused violence,
economic instability, and human rights violations).
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will further define the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) which guarantee the right to
property and due process of the law.7
Part II will argue that although land reform is needed in
Zimbabwe, its current law is arbitrary, racially discriminatory,
disregards due process, and denies compensation for property
takings.8 It will further argue that the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) Tribunal’s decision that Zimbabwe’s land
reform is discriminatory and denies access to the courts conforms to
international standards, and that Zimbabwe is required to follow it.9
Part III recommends that Zimbabwe recognize the SADC
Tribunal’s decision and implement its judgment domestically.10 This
section also encourages Zimbabwe to amend its constitution to meet
international standards.11 Lastly, the Comment concludes that
Zimbabwe is currently heading down a dangerous path, which
isolates it and decreases its legitimacy within the international
community.12 Thus, if Zimbabwe changes its law to respect human
rights standards, it can begin to rectify these errors.13

I. BACKGROUND
When President Mugabe became the first president of the
independent Zimbabwe in 1980, he pledged to undo the devastating
7. See discussion infra Part I.C (stating the minimum international standards
to which all states must comply).
8. Cf. discussion infra Part II (referring to Articles 15 of the UDHR and 14 of
the Banjul Charter on the right to property, and Articles 8 of the UDHR and 7(1)(a)
of the Banjul Charter on the right to due process).
9. See discussion infra Part II (noting that Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court has
stated that, under most circumstances, as long as public policy is not contradicted,
it should adhere to SADC Tribunal decisions).
10. See discussion infra Part III.A, C (suggesting that in the absence of this
development, potential plaintiffs should continue to make use of foreign and
regional courts).
11. See discussion infra Part III.B (suggesting that Zimbabwe could meet
international standards by moving towards negotiated land reform instead of
compulsory acquisitions).
12. See discussion infra CONCLUSION (observing that nations that have
previously supported Zimbabwe have distanced themselves since Zimbabwe began
its fast-track land reform program).
13. See id. (encouraging Zimbabwe to take tangible steps to reform its laws).
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effects of colonialism and improve the plight of oppressed Africans
in Zimbabwe.14 Since land reform efforts have begun, Mugabe has
not met this promise, as black Zimbabweans who have received land
in redistribution often have limited resources or insufficient funds to
productively use the land they are given.15 Remaining white
landowners have insecure tenure and are victimized by those
carrying out violent evictions.16 Investors are hesitant to invest
money in Zimbabwe because there is insecure tenure and no promise
of fair compensation for redistributed property.17 Over 500,000 exfarm workers have become internally displaced after their employers
were evicted from land.18 Today, these tensions pervade public
policy, economics, and legal discourse.19

A. ZIMBABWE’S POST-INDEPENDENCE LAND REFORM EFFORTS
When Zimbabwe gained independence from Great Britain in 1980,
it agreed to restrict compulsory land expropriations for ten years.20
14. But cf. Nick Dancaescu, Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 615,
618 (2003) (recounting that at independence, Zimbabwe was considered a shining
example of an African nation that was able to cast off the burdens of colonialism).
15. See Heather Boyle, Note, The Land Problem: What does the Future Hold
for South Africa’s Land Reform Program?, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 665,
696 (2001) (claiming that redistribution of land in Zimbabwe is ineffective because
the people receiving land do not have the knowledge or tools to make it
productive); see also Ngoni Chanakira, White farmer takes farm back, NEW
ZIMBABWE.COM (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news/print
Version.aspx?newsID=4197 (revealing that some of the land reform program’s
beneficiaries have actually re-leased the land they were given to its former owner,
because the new beneficiary lacks the resources to effectively use the land).
16. See Karimakwenda, supra note 3 (recounting deaths and assaults on white
farmers from violent land invasions and evictions).
17. Bureau of Afr. Affairs, Background Note: Zimbabwe, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Nov.
3, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5479.htm#econ (stating that investor
confidence remains low in Zimbabwe because of tenure insecurity and the land
reform laws).
18. See Hartnack, supra note 2, at 351 (recounting the obstacles and stigma that
ex-farm workers face, including exclusion from redistribution allotments, if they
support the interests of their “white bosses”).
19. See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 1, at 103 (contrasting Zimbabwe’s
polarized image either as a “land sinking into quagmire and poverty or as a land at
the forefront of the battle against racist Western imperialism”); see also Bureau of
Afr. Affairs, supra note 17 (revealing that Zimbabwe’s economy has contracted
forty percent since 1999 and large scale commercial farming has mostly collapsed
due to aggressive land reform laws).
20. See Agreements Concluded at Lancaster House Conference, U.K.-Zim.
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During these years, Zimbabwe used a “willing buyer, willing seller”
method to redistribute land.21 This voluntary land redistribution
method allowed individuals to purchase land from private
landowners with government loans.22 While this program did
redistribute some land, critics complained that the process moved too
slowly.23
In 1992, Zimbabwe passed the Land Acquisition Act to allow the
government to acquire land compulsorily from owners, accompanied
by fair compensation for the property.24 Seven years into the
Rhodesia, Annex C, pt. C, § V(1), pt. E, para. 30, Nov. 22, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 387
(1980) [hereinafter Lancaster Agreement] (allowing any property the government
acquires to be contested in court and entitling the former owner to adequate and
prompt compensation, and limiting changes of this provision for the first ten years
after its passage by requiring a unanimous vote in the House Assembly and twothirds vote in the Senate to repeal it); see also Jonathan Shirley, Note, The Role of
International Human Rights and the Law of Diplomatic Protection in Resolving
Zimbabwe’s Land Crisis, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 161, 162 (2004)
(conveying that Great Britain put limitations on property acquisition to protect
white farmers in majority-ruled Zimbabwe).
21. See David Shriver, Note, Rectifying Land Ownership Disparities Through
Expropriation: Why Recent Land Reform Measures in Namibia are
Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419,
433 (2005) (defining the “willing buyer, willing seller” method as a system used to
voluntarily transfer land from colonial landowners to previously disenfranchised
stakeholders). At the time, Great Britain also agreed to contribute funding to allow
the Zimbabwean government to purchase land. Id.; cf. Claxton, supra note 1, at
541 (comparing this agreement to Kenya’s, in which the government agreed not to
compulsorily expropriate land in exchange for foreign funding).
22. Cf. Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize et al., Introduction and Summary, in
AGRICULTURAL LAND REDISTRIBUTION: TOWARDS GREATER CONSENSUS 3, 21
(Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize et al. eds., 2009) (differentiating Zimbabwe’s
program from Namibia’s, in which all private landowners were required to offer
their land to be purchased by the government before attempting to sell it on the
market, giving the government a “right of first refusal” for all property).
23. See Shriver, supra note 21, at 447 (quoting Namibia’s Prime Minister who
found that the willing-buyer, willing-seller approach was overly cumbersome to
reach the land reform programs’ ultimate goals); see also Claxton, supra note 1, at
544 (arguing that market-based land reform tactics are not sufficient in nations that
engage in widespread restructuring of land distribution). But see Bill H. Kinsey,
Land Reform, Growth and Equity: Emerging Evidence from Zimbabwe’s
Resettlement Programme, 25 J. S. AFR. STUD. 173, 177-78 (1999) (emphasizing
that despite criticisms, Zimbabwe’s voluntary land reform program, to date, has
significantly outpaced all other such programs in sub-Saharan Africa).
24. See Land Acquisition Act (Act No. 3/1992), as amended, c. 20:10, §
29C(1) (Zim.) (requiring just compensation for all land acquired for redistribution
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program, by 1999, 71,000 black families had been resettled.25 In
2000, Zimbabwean voters rejected a constitutional referendum that
would have allowed the government to further implement its fasttrack land reform program based primarily on compulsory land
acquisitions.26 Instead of accepting defeat, President Mugabe and
Parliament passed constitutional Amendments 16A and 16B, which
allow the government to acquire land without safeguards to prevent
arbitrary application, guarantees to due process, or compensation.27
Amendment 16A requires Great Britain, instead of Zimbabwe, to
pay landowners for their expropriated property.28 It justifies this by
claiming that Great Britain has the responsibility to pay because it
colonized Zimbabwe and dispossessed legitimate owners by
or any other purpose); see also BRIAN MACGARRY, LAND FOR WHICH PEOPLE?:
SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 17 (1994) (explaining that the Lancaster
Agreement made it much easier for Zimbabwe to do large-scale land acquisitions
only after 1990).
25. See, e.g., Shirley, supra note 20, at 163 (emphasizing that these 71,000
families were resettled through government purchases of 3.8 million hectares of
land, using fair compensation as the payment standard). But see Boyle, supra note
15, at 693 (referring to evidence that Zimbabwe has redistributed land corruptly,
and that some recipients of redistributed land are not those most in need, but
President Mugabe’s political cronies).
26. See Zimbabwe says no, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Feb. 16, 2000),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/feb/16/zimbabwe.guardianleaders
(reporting that Mugabe severely miscalculated his political strength, leading to the
rejection of his referendum); see also Rutherford, supra note 1, at 104 (naming this
defeat as a landmark moment for Zimbabwe because it was the first time the ruling
party faced real opposition to its policies).
27. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art.
16A(2) (listing factors that may affect assessments for compensation for
improvements, but not mentioning factors that should be used to determine which
land to target) (preventing landowners from applying to courts to challenge
acquisitions) (prohibiting compensation for land acquired for redistribution,
except for improvements); see also Anne Hellum & Bill Derman, Land Reform
and Human Rights in Contemporary Zimbabwe: Balancing Individual and Social
Justice Through an Integrated Human Rights Framework, 32 WORLD DEV. 1785,
1792 (2004) (recounting that after the referendum was rejected, Mugabe
introduced the exact same words into an April 2000 amendment, which was then
adopted by Parliament).
28. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art.
16A(1)(c) (“The former colonial power has an obligation to pay compensation for
agricultural land compulsorily acquired for resettlement, . . . and if the former
colonial power fails to pay compensation through such a fund, the Government of
Zimbabwe has no obligation to pay compensation for agricultural land
compulsorily acquired for resettlement.”)
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promulgating and enforcing racist laws.29 Amendment 16B
eliminates notice requirements for land redistribution and prevents
landowners from challenging government acquisitions in an
independent court.30 After these changes were made, violent land
seizures gripped Zimbabwe, with so-called “war veterans” invading
large commercial farms and violently forcing out the owners.31

B. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY UNDER THE UDHR AND THE BANJUL
CHARTER
International law is somewhat ambiguous on the minimum
standard for an individual’s right to property, and when a violation of
that right occurs.32 International courts have been hesitant to protect
29. See id. art. 16A(1)(a)-(c) (naming the most important factors related to land
redistribution: 1) that the people in Zimbabwe were unjustifiably dispossessed of
their land during colonial domination; 2) that Zimbabwe regained independence by
taking up arms against the colonizers; and 3) that to reassert their rights and regain
ownership to their land, Zimbabwe should be able to compulsorily acquire land
from current owners without paying them). But see Shriver, supra note 21, at 451
(questioning the legality of the Zimbabwean government’s controversial decision
to not provide compensation to owners, and concluding that such a decision
violates international standards).
30. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art.
16B(3)(a), (4) (“A person having any right or interest in the land shall not apply to
a court to challenge the acquisition of the land by the State, and no court shall
entertain any such challenge . . . . As soon as practicable . . . the person responsible
under any law providing for the registration of title over land shall, without further
notice, effect the necessary endorsements upon any title deed . . . for the purpose of
formally cancelling the title deed and registering in the State title over the land.");
see also ISAAC MAPOSA, CATHOLIC COMM’N FOR JUSTICE & PEACE IN ZIM., LAND
REFORM IN ZIMBABWE 73-74 (1995) (interpreting the Land Acquisition Act, the
implementing legislation for Amendments 16A and 16B, to also deny individuals
access to the court to contest land designation, acquisition, or fairness of the
amount of compensation for improvements).
31. See Alex Bell, Zimbabwe: Farmers Slam Fresh Onslaught of Land-Grab
Violence, ALLAFRICA.COM (Oct. 28, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201010
290064.html (reporting that landowners have been assaulted, severely beaten,
killed, and forced to leave their homes by gangs, without any prior notice). Many
of the so-called “war veterans” involved in these land invasions were likely thugs
hired by or implicitly supported by the government. Peter Godwin, Ulterior
Motives: Mugabe prizes political dominance over peace and prosperity, TIME
(World), May 1, 2000, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,205043
2,00.html.
32. See Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights art. 14, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982) [hereinafter Banjul Charter] (protecting property, but allowing acquisitions
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private property interests as robustly as other human rights, such as
the prohibition against torture or arbitrary detentions.33 The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, two major
human rights treaties, do not even explicitly refer to property rights. 34
Because property rights involve a delicate balance between
individual rights and national welfare, international law shies away
from absolute property rights and instead balances the need to protect
individual rights with national interests.35
in the public interest that conform to domestic laws); see also Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]
(including a provision that requires just compensation, but allowing states to
subordinate property rights with domestic legislation); Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Protocol I, art. 1, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR, Protocol I] (granting the right to
property, limited by domestic laws that are in accordance with general principles
of international law); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, art. 17(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]
(failing to require compensation for compulsory property acquisitions); see also
Pedro Nikken, Balancing of Human Rights and Investment Law in the InterAmerican System of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 246, 247 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds.,
2009) (assessing that the development of human rights law as a result of gruesome
and repressive government regimes has made protection of property rights seem
less imperative).
33. See Margaroli v. Argentina, Case 11.400, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report
No. 5/09, ¶ 87 (2009), http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2009eng/argentina
11400eng.htm#_ftn1 (absolving itself of responsibility to decide if a domestic
court’s compensation has been just); cf. John McClung Nading, Comment,
Property Under Siege: The Legality of Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 16 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 737, 786 (2002) (citing scholars who claim that private property
ownership is a second-tier human right when compared to rights to life, liberty, or
security). See generally Afr. Inst. for Human Rights & Dev. v. Guinea, 2004 Afr.
Hum. Rts. L. Rep. 57 (Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2004) (finding
a violation of the right to property only when in conjunction with facts involving
torture, assault, rape, and physical property destruction).
34. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR] (failing to mention individual
property rights); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (declining to protect the right to
property). But cf. Bronwen Manby, Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe, 14
HUM. RTS. WATCH, no. 1, 2002 at 37 (stating that interpretations of the ICCPR
clarify that the Convention’s anti-discrimination clause does protect the right to
property, even though it is not explicitly stated).
35. See Nading, supra note 33, at 776-78 (finding that developing nations often
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The UDHR and the Banjul Charter, both of which Zimbabwe has
signed,36 specifically address property rights in Articles 17 and 14,
respectively.37 Both of these documents are important because they
inform States of minimum international human rights standards to
which they are obliged to adhere to domestically.38
Article 17 of the UDHR guarantees individuals the right to own
property and not to have it arbitrarily deprived.39 Article 8 of the
UDHR further guarantees that when fundamental rights are violated,
individuals have a right to an effective remedy by a court or
tribunal.40 Article 14 of the Banjul Charter also guarantees the right
to property, although it allows the government to take property for
the public good in conformity with appropriate laws.41 Like the
UDHR, Article 17 of the Banjul Charter also gives all individuals
the right to due process and to have claims heard before an
independent court.42 Together, these provisions provide the basis for
property protection for landowners in Zimbabwe.

lean towards expropriations to improve the national welfare, while developed
countries value individual rights more strongly).
36. See Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1787 (listing relevant treaties
Zimbabwe has signed that affect Zimbabwe’s obligations in its land reform laws).
37. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(1)-(2) (protecting the right to property
and prohibiting arbitrary takings); see also Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14
(protecting property, limited by takings in the public interest).
38. Cf. Edward D. Re, Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights, 27
AKRON L. REV. 281, 283-84 (1994) (claiming that no responsible world leader
would disclaim that the UDHR guarantees minimum protections that are binding
on all nations).
39. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(1)-(2) (“1) Everyone has the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others. 2) No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property.”); see also Sean Romero, Note, Mass Forced Evictions
and the Human Right to Adequate Housing in Zimbabwe, 5 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 275, 291 (2007) (arguing that the UDHR’s prohibition on arbitrary takings
has a jus cogens character in international law).
40. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”).
41. See Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14 (“The right to property shall be
guaranteed. It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the
general interest of the community and in accordance with the provisions of
appropriate laws.”).
42. See id. art. 7(1) (“Every individual shall have the right to have his cause
heard.”).
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C. TENSION BETWEEN THE ZIMBABWEAN JUDICIARY AND THE
SADC TRIBUNAL REGARDING THE LEGALITY OF AMENDMENTS
16A AND 16B
In 2007, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court issued its decision on
the constitutionality of Amendments 16A and 16B in Campbell v.
Minister of National Security Responsible for Land, Land Reform,
and Resettlement.43 It held that land reform is a non-justiciable
political question, and that the Constitution could legally deny a right
to access courts to challenge land acquisitions.44 Contrastingly, while
the decision in the Supreme Court was still pending, the SADC
Tribunal held, in Campbell v. Republic of Zimbabwe, that
Amendments 16A and 16B violate international law because they are
discriminatory and deny individuals the fundamental right to access
courts and have their grievance heard.45
Under its founding treaty, the SADC Tribunal has jurisdiction to
hear cases involving individual human rights and the rule of law.46
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe has accepted the SADC Tribunal’s
validity and has accepted that it should adhere to the Tribunal’s
decisions, except in matters where the decision would contradict
public policy.47 The SADC Tribunal began operating in 2007, and
Campbell was its first case.48 Because the Tribunal is so new, the
43. See Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 28 (Zim.)
(deciding that Campbell’s rights had not been violated by the promulgation of
Amendments 16A and 16B, and that he had no right to a remedy).
44. See id. (arguing that the protections a person receives under the
Constitution for their private property has a political and legislative character,
which is beyond the scope of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction).
45. See Campbell Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty.
Trib. 2008) (holding that all applicants have been denied access to Zimbabwean
courts and subjected to racial discrimination).
46. See Treaty of the Southern African Development Community art. 4, Aug.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116, 126 [hereinafter SADC Treaty] (“SADC and its Member
States shall act in accordance with the following principles . . . human rights,
democracy, and the rule of law.”).
47. See David Hemel & Andrew Schalkwyk, Tyranny on Trial: Regional
Courts Crack Down on Mugabe’s Land “Reform”, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 517, 518
(2010) (remarking that Zimbabwe has indicated that it would be against public
policy to register a regional court decision that would contradict a domestic
decision).
48. See id. at 517 (noting that in deciding Campbell Ltd. v. Zim., Case No.
2/2007 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2008), the Tribunal established itself as a forum
to provide relief for human rights violations).
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scope and impact it will have on Southern Africa is still unclear.49
However, if it continues to issue strong human rights decisions as it
did in Campbell, the Tribunal’s breadth may be wider than originally
envisioned.50
The Zimbabwe High Court considered the SADC Tribunal’s
decision in Gramara v. Republic of Zimbabwe.51 The Court accepted
that a state cannot invoke its own domestic deficiencies to evade
international obligations and that it must make a good faith effort to
conform to treaty obligations.52 It also recognized that Zimbabweans
and the international community have a legitimate expectation that
Zimbabwe will adhere to SADC Tribunal decisions and enforce its
judgments.53 However, when balancing these concerns against
Zimbabwe’s public policy on land reform and Zimbabweans’
legitimate expectations that Zimbabwe would follow its own
Constitution, Gramara held that the SADC Tribunal decision was
contrary to public policy and unenforceable domestically.54

II. ANALYSIS
Failure to conform land reform laws to minimum international
obligations has stark and often tragic consequences on landless black
Zimbabweans, landowners, and other stakeholders who suffer most

49. See id. at 521 (hypothesizing that the Tribunal’s growing docket indicates
that it could become a major factor in enforcing human rights in Southern Africa,
although realizing that practical difficulties enforcing the judgments cast some
doubts on how effective it can be).
50. See id. at 517 (noting that while the SADC was rather stagnant for the first
decade of its operation, the Tribunal, operational since 2007, has been incredibly
proactive especially in respect to human rights).
51. See Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, ¶ 5 (High Ct. Zim.)
(analyzing the effect of the SADC Tribunal’s decision in Zimbabwe’s domestic
courts).
52. See id. (noting that the international law tenant is obligated to perform all
treaties in good faith, regardless of any domesticating legislation).
53. See id. at 13 (agreeing that by signing the Treaty and submitting to the
SADC Tribunal’s jurisdiction, Zimbabwe has created an enforceable expectation
that it will follow the SADC Tribunal’s decisions).
54. See id. at 16 (arguing that far more Zimbabweans have a legitimate
expectation that Zimbabwe will follow its own laws and Constitution than those
that expect it to adhere to SADC Tribunal decisions). Since the SADC Tribunal
decision made it impossible to meet both of these expectations, the Court declined
to register the judgment. Id.
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directly.55 Not only is fast-track land reform harmful, it fails to meet
the standards in Articles 8 and 17(2) of the UDHR and Articles 7(1)
and 14 of the Banjul Charter because it is arbitrary, violates due
process of law, and denies compensation to landowners.56 By
refusing to repeal Amendments 16A and 16B, and by not adhering to
the SADC Tribunal decision in Campbell, Zimbabwe is in breach of
its obligations under international law.57

A. AMENDMENTS 16A AND 16B VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
AND THE PROHIBITION ON ARBITRARY TAKINGS.
Zimbabwe’s current law provides governmental agencies with
broad discretion to take land, leading to arbitrary takings based on
racial criteria.58 By allowing arbitrary takings, Zimbabwe violates the
right to property guaranteed in Article 14 of the Banjul Charter and
55. See, e.g., Nading, supra note 35, at 751-53 (tracking the economic decline
of Zimbabwe under the fast-track land reform program, from one of the most
prosperous nations in Africa to a nation facing an economic and social crisis where
half the population is threatened with starvation); see also MICHAEL LIPTON, LAND
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PROPERTY WRONGS
55 (2009) (claiming that fast-track reform has not reduced beneficiaries’ reliance
on food purchases and has caused laborers to lose their jobs, livelihood, and access
to social services).
56. See UDHR, supra note 32, arts. 8, 17; Banjul Charter, supra note 32, arts.
7(1), 14 (protecting the right to property, preventing arbitrary deprivations, and
requiring due process for individuals); see also Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing
Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search
for Accountability, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 591, 592 (1998) (asserting that all
individuals should be protected under the law and have the right to justice if their
human rights have been violated).
57. E.g., Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1786 (concluding that “the fasttrack resettlement program is illegal, unconstitutional, and a violation of human
rights standard[s] . . . .”); see also CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No.
5 of 2005), arts. 16A-16B (not including proper safeguards against arbitrary
takings); Campbell Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007, 57 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty.
Trib. 2008) (finding that Amendments 16A and 16B have led to arbitrary racial
discrimination).
58. See MAPOSA, supra note 30, at 74, 76 (criticizing the Act for the discretion
it leaves for implementing authorities and raising the issue that it does not prohibit
officials from targeting land for racial or other impermissible reasons); see also
MACGARRY, supra note 24, at 18 (pointing to instances where land was acquired
to punish political opposition or as an alternative to prosecution in court). See
generally Land Acquisition Act, supra note 24 (failing to provide clear,
measurable criterion to government officials acquiring land to prevent takings
based on unlawful motivations).
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the prohibition on non-arbitrary takings in Article 17(2) of the
UDHR.59 The Zimbabwean Supreme Court has disregarded its
domestic laws and international law by not striking down
Amendment 16A and 16B.60
1. Amendments 16A and 16B violate Article 17(2) of the UDHR and
Article 14 of the Banjul Charter because they are arbitrary.
Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform gives an impermissible amount
of discretion to the government to expropriate property, which has
led to racially-based land reform, in violation of Article 17 of the
UDHR and Article 14 of the Banjul Charter.61
The UDHR specifically guarantees that property must not be taken
arbitrarily.62 Although the UDHR does not define the term arbitrary,
it is often measured by the amount of procedural safeguards the law
provides, or by how the law impacts certain classes when it is
applied.63
Unlike the UDHR, the Banjul Charter does not specifically refer

59. Compare Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14, and UDHR, supra note 32,
art. 17(1)-(2) (guaranteeing property rights to individuals, with a prohibition on
arbitrary takings), with CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of
2005), art. 16B (refusing to adopt criteria that would prevent racial applications of
its land expropriation authorization).
60. See Campbell Ltd. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 13 (Zim.)
(declining to decide whether the law is racially discriminatory); cf. Andy Mielnik,
Comment, Hugo Chavez: Venezuela’s New Bandito or Zorro?, 14 L. & BUS. REV.
AM. 591, 603 (2008) (finding that Zimbabwe’s current land reform program is far
from meeting international or domestic standards and can be considered a
“tyrannical land reform regime”).
61. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 16B
(allowing expropriations without naming specific guidelines to target property);
Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14; UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2). This
protection is also considered incorporated into customary international law. See
Re, supra note 38, at 284 (noting that the UDHR standards contain the minimum,
not maximum, protections that a state must guarantee individuals).
62. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2).
63. See, e.g., ELETTRONICA SICULA S.P.A. (U.S. V. IT.), JUDGMENT, 1989 I.C.J.
15, 76 (July 20) (defining arbitrariness as contrary to the rule of law to the level of
shocking a sense of judicial propriety); Shriver, supra note 21, at 438-47 (arguing
that Namibia’s land law that allows expropriations in the public interest is too
expansive to prevent arbitrary application because it allows the government to
single out white farm owners who have fired black workers).
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to arbitrary takings in its clause on property protections.64 It also
qualifies its protection of private property by allowing takings in the
“general interest of the community” according to “appropriate
laws.”65 The broadness of this clause has led some to believe that the
Banjul Charter gives states practically unbridled discretion to take
property as long as it is supported by any law, presumably including
Amendments 16A and 16B.66 This argument is problematic because
while land redistribution is certainly in Zimbabwe’s “general
interest,”67 an arbitrary law is not an “appropriate law” within the
meaning of the Banjul Charter, especially when applying basic treaty
interpretation principles.68 Because the African Commission has not
considered a case similar to the facts of this case, the only means to
analyze Article 14 of the Banjul Charter is through a treaty
64. See Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14 (guaranteeing the right to
property, but qualified by public interest takings).
65. Id. But cf. EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 142 (1996) (admitting that
although the Banjul Charter is supposed to bind signatory African nations, there is
evidence that some seize property without due process).
66. See Shirley, supra note 20, at 168 (criticizing the Banjul Charter for the
discretion it gives states to acquire land, undermining its force as a human rights
document); see also Romero, supra note 39, at 288 (wondering whether the Banjul
Charter adequately protects property since it does not define the term property or
prohibit forced evictions and gives states discretion in implementing national
laws). But see Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: The
African Charter, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 679, 688-89 (2004) (clarifying that while
those unfamiliar with the African Commission may believe the Banjul Charter
subordinates its principles to domestic laws, the Commission has stipulated that
national laws may only limit rights if those limitations are in accordance with
international human rights principles).
67. Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14. Especially for post-colonial states
with highly unequal land distribution, land reform is an important and worthy goal,
as long as it is accomplished without violating others’ human rights. Cf. Rahman
Ford, Comment, Law, History, and the Colonial Discourse: Davies v.
Commissioner and Zimbabwe as a Colonialist Case Study, 45 HOW. L. J. 213, 244
(2001) (reviewing the suffering of black Zimbabweans under colonialism and their
right to have access to land ownership).
68. See Vincent O. Nmehielle, Development of the African Human Rights
System in the Last Decade, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, no. 1, 2008 at 6-7 (explaining that
despite the existence of “claw-back” provisions in the ACPHR that seem to
subordinate its guarantees to domestic law, the African Commission has
interpreted the Banjul Charter to provide individuals with robust protection). The
Commission has confirmed that international human rights laws are overarching
principles that may not be limited by domestic interference. See id. (reiterating that
the Banjul Charter does not have a derogation clause).
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interpretation.69
The Vienna Convention requires all treaties to be interpreted in
good faith, according to their ordinary meaning, while also
considering their object and purpose.70 The Convention also
presumes that states negotiate treaties within the context of their
international obligations; therefore, a good faith interpretation
requires the interpreter to assume that the treaty was written with the
intent that states would apply it in accordance with internationally
accepted principles.71
Applying the Vienna Convention’s dictates on treaty interpretation
to Article 14 of the Banjul Charter, it is clear that the Charter is not
meant to provide states with flexibility to arbitrarily take land. As a
human rights treaty, it is unreasonable to interpret the Banjul Charter
in a way that legitimizes arbitrary takings or refuses to protect
property owners who are targeted based on their race. 72 In addition,
using the Vienna Convention’s requirement to consider the ordinary
meaning of the treaty language, Article 14 of the Banjul Charter only
allows taking in the “general interest of the community.”73 It is not in

69. See VINCENT O. NMEHIELLE, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ITS
LAWS, PRACTICE, AND INSTITUTIONS 120 (2001) [hereinafter NMEHIELLE, HUMAN
RIGHTS SYSTEM] (admitting that there is little case law published by the African
Commission to accurately determine the scope that Article 14 is intended to
cover).
70. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“A treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
71. See, e.g., Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in
U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 448 (2004) (reviewing human
rights bodies to conclude that international tribunals refuse to accept subjective or
unusual treaty interpretations, avoid treaty interpretations that derogate from
internationally accepted standards, and only look to sources beyond the treaty text
when it is particularly ambiguous or confusing).
72. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Between Promise and Performance:
Revisiting States’ Obligations under the African Human Rights Charter, 40 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 105, 110 (2004) (describing the purpose of the Banjul Charter as an
assertion of universal human rights principles designed to be binding on all African
nations, particularly principles of freedom, dignity, justice, and nondiscrimination).
73. See Vienna Convention, supra note 70, art. 31(1); Banjul Charter, supra
note 32, art. 14; see also Criddle, supra note 71, at 446-47 (explaining that
ordinary meaning refers to a strict textual interpretation whenever possible).
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any state or any community’s interest to violate its citizens’ basic
human rights, as Amendments 16A and 16B do by allowing arbitrary
application and racial discrimination.74 Although President Mugabe
has argued that these takings are a rational method to redress
unlawful colonial dispossessions, post-colonial practice requires
states to respect owners who have current titles to land in order to
protect the rule of law.75 As Zimbabwe has proven, fast-track land
reform degrades the rule of law and breeds violence, contrary to the
general interest of its citizens.
Additionally, it is incorrect to assume the Banjul Charter is meant
to encompass any law within “appropriate law;” instead, appropriate
laws are only those which conform to internationally accepted
principles of non-arbitrariness and non-discrimination.76 This
interpretation also aligns with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties’ direction that interpreters should assume that treaties intend
to follow international precepts, which include prohibitions on
arbitrary laws and racial discrimination.77 While the African
Commission has not satisfactorily interpreted Article 14, in other
instances it has relied on outside treaties and international
documents, particularly the UDHR, to inform its own analysis.78 In
74. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8 (requiring states to provide a remedy to
victims of any human rights violations perpetrated by the state); see also Joyner,
supra note 56, at 592 (noting that when a state allows human rights violations, it
becomes obligated to provide a remedy).
75. See THEO R. G. VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PROPERTY 283
(2002) (explaining that with the possible rare exception of a party that was directly
responsible for acquiring the land unjustifiably, the state must follow due process
principles and execute land takings through a fair process using an independent
tribunal).
76. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2); see International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
[hereinafter ICERD] (declaring that all human beings are equal before the law and
are entitled to equal treatment, and condemning all forms of racial discrimination).
77. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2); ICERD, supra note 76; see also Criddle,
supra note 71, at 448 (finding that according to the Vienna Convention, states
should interpret treaties in a manner that recognizes the preeminence of
international law).
78. See Banjul Charter, supra note 32, arts. 60-61 (indicating that it is
appropriate to use outside treaties and general principles of law as a subsidiary
means to determine a state’s human rights obligations, and specifically mentioning
the UDHR as a document that the Commission should consider when applying the
Banjul Charter’s mandates); see also NMEHIELLE, HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, supra
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these instances, the Commission has found that supposed “clawback” provisions, that seem to subordinate international law to
domestic provisions, may not be utilized to allow a state to derogate
from internationally-accepted principles.79 Instead, it has interpreted
the Banjul Charter in ways that closely align with other human rights
documents and has given states very little discretion to limit rights
under their domestic laws.80 Therefore, an analysis of the ordinary
meaning of the Charter and a consideration of the liberal manner in
which the Commission has interpreted provisions that limit rights to
domestic laws reveal that the Charter’s protection of property does
encompass internationally accepted principles that prohibit arbitrary
or racially-based property deprivation.81
Zimbabwe’s land reform law is arbitrary under Article 17 of the
UDHR and not appropriate under Article 14 of the Banjul Charter
because it does not provide any objective criteria to guide land
expropriations, which allows it to be easily abused and racially
discriminatory.82 In addition to not providing any criteria to guide
expropriations, it does not define basic terms to provide guidance to
implementing authorities to even know which land should be
acquired and who is eligible for redistribution.83 In implementing
note 69, at 159 (considering that Articles 60 to 61 of the Banjul Charter may give
the Commission expansive power to extend the reach of the Charter to encompass
the same protections as other regional and universal human rights documents).
79. See Heyns, supra note 66, at 689 (praising the Commission for prohibiting
states from departing from internationally-accepted standards, even in respect to
provisions in the Banjul Charter that contain clauses that seemingly subordinate
their protection to domestic law).
80. See id. at 689-90 (looking to decisions of the Commission to confirm it
does not provide States with discretion to limit the rights articulated in the Banjul
Charter, regardless of whether there is a limiting clause).
81. See Vienna Convention, supra note 70, at 31(1) (stating that a treaty should
be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning). But cf. Banjul Charter, supra
note 32, art. 14 (allowing arbitrary takings as long as it is in the interest of the
public under the ordinary language of Article 14).
82. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2); Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14; see
ALLAHYAR MOURI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EXPROPRIATION AS REFLECTED
IN THE WORK OF THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 329 (1994) (noting that various
international tribunals have held that discriminatory expropriations are always
illegal).
83. See Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1794 (noting that the law targets
underutilized farms without defining underutilized farm and names the landless as
beneficiaries without providing guidelines to determine which people are landless).
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Amendments 16A and 16B to redistribute land, Zimbabwe has
discriminated against white landowners by targeting only whiteowned land for redistribution and attempting to eradicate whiteowned farms in Zimbabwe.84 Additionally, Zimbabwe has not
adopted any fair criteria, such as proper use of land, Zimbabwean
citizenship, or other relevant factors to decide which lands to
expropriate.85 Refusing to adopt fair measuring criteria invites abuse
and de facto racial discrimination.86
Not only does fast-track land reform discriminate against white
farmers based on disproportionate impact, it also intentionally targets
white farmers.87 Ample evidence demonstrates that Amendments
16A and 16B were passed because of hostility towards white farmers
and to ease the government’s ability to redistribute land on racial
terms.88 Before introducing Amendments 16A and 16B, President
84. See, e.g., Amy Ochoa Carson, Note, East Timor’s Land Tenure Problems:
A Consideration of Land Reform Programs in Zimbabwe and South Africa, 17 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 395, 421 (2007) (asserting that Zimbabwe’s program may
have been conducted to “punish whites”); see also Paul Mysliwiec, Comment,
Accomplice to Genocide Liability: The Case for a Purpose Mens Rea Standard, 10
CHI. J. INT’L L. 389, 398-99 (2009) (suggesting that Mugabe garnered support for
land redistribution by vilifying whites).
85. See Campbell Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007, 53 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty.
Trib. 2008) (noting that criteria for redistribution are “not reasonable and objective
but arbitrary and based primarily on considerations of race”); see also MAPOSA,
supra note 30, at 73 (considering it particularly concerning that while many land
reform programs only compulsorily acquire underutilized land, Zimbabwe’s law
allows even economically productive land to be targeted for redistribution).
86. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 52 (explaining that when a law
affects only white farmers, it is indirectly, or de facto discriminatory).
87. See ICERD, supra note 76, art. 1 (outlawing distinctions that “ha[ve] the
purpose or effect” of discriminating against persons based on race); see also U.N.
Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 198, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter HRC Comment] (defining
discrimination as laws that have the “purpose or effect” of putting persons of
certain races on an unequal footing as others in General Comment No. 18).
88. See Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1794 (stating that Zanu-PF,
Zimbabwe’s ruling party, labels all whites as unsupportive of Zanu-PF’s rule and
believes that human rights regarding land should not apply to them); see also
BRIAN RAFTOPOULOS, THE POLITICS OF THE MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE,
New Zimbabwe (NOV. 12, 2009), http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/
opinion140.14149.html (reviewing an ad before a referendum to amend the land
reform law that pictured an elderly white couple, and the caption “Are you going
to allow them to continue to tell you what to do?”).
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Mugabe even called white farmers “enemies of the state.”89 This
attitude towards white farmers shows a racially discriminatory intent,
while the lack of clear guidance towards applying the law allows it to
be applied to disproportionately affect white landowners.90 Together,
these deficiencies constitute violations of the UDHR and the Banjul
Charter’s protection of property and prohibition on arbitrary takings,
which includes racially-based takings.91
2. The Zimbabwe Supreme Court erred by not following its
Declaration of Rights, the SADC Tribunal decision, or South African
persuasive precedent in Campbell.
When the Zimbabwe Supreme Court considered Campbell, it had
the opportunity to enjoin land redistribution until objective criteria
were formed, invalidate Amendments 16A and 16B completely, or
provide damages to the white farm owners who claimed their land
was targeted because of their race.92 Instead, it ignored the possibility
that fast-track land reform could be implicitly discriminatory, and
instead decided, ipse dixit, that because the Amendments did not
reference race explicitly, they were not racially discriminatory. 93
This decision was incorrect as a matter of Zimbabwe’s domestic
law and international law.94 Zimbabwe’s Declaration of Rights
89. Boyle, supra note 15, at 684. See id. at 685 (relating that Mugabe argued
that war veterans have attacked white farmers because of their frustrations at white
farmers for behaving as enemies of Zimbabwe, and that following these
inflammatory speeches, thirty-one people were killed in farm invasions in an onemonth period).
90. See Mysliwiec, supra note 84, at 398 (providing evidence that almost all
white-owned farms were seized under “fast-track” land reform); see also VAN
BANNING, supra note 75, at 333 (asserting that the only criteria the government
used when applying the land reform law was race-based criteria).
91. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 17(2); Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 14.
92. See Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 1-2
(reviewing the claims made by the Petitioners); see also Hemel & Schalkwyk,
supra note 47, at 519 (noting that the Supreme Court passed on its opportunity to
invalidate Amendments 16A and 16B based on the idea that Zimbabwe’s
Constitution has core features that cannot be overridden by constitutional
amendments).
93. See Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 at 13 (failing to analyze Zimbabwe’s
non-discrimination clause and ignoring the portion of the non-discrimination
clause that denounces racial discrimination).
94. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), arts.
16(1)(a), 23 (restricting expropriations to those that can be shown to be reasonably
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ensures that property may only be acquired under authority of law
and that individuals have a right not to be treated in a racially
discriminatory manner.95 The Zimbabwean Supreme Court
incorrectly found that a law that does not reference race cannot
trigger the anti-discrimination clause in section 23 of its
Constitution.96 In making this decision, the Court ignored the portion
of the anti-discrimination clause that expressly prohibits
discriminatory treatment in effect.97 Amendments 16A and 16B are
intended to, and have led to different treatment based on race,
making them racially discriminatory and in violation of Zimbabwe’s
anti-discrimination clause.98
In addition to ignoring domestic legal tenants, the Supreme Court
ignored its obligations in the international realm by not adhering to
the SADC Tribunal’s decision in Campbell.99 Upon consideration of
necessary by the government and prohibiting discrimination on racial grounds); see
also SADC Treaty, supra note 46, art. 4 (obligating states’ parties to adhere the
protection of to individuals’ human rights).
95. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), arts.
16(1)(a), 23 (restricting expropriations to those that can be shown to be reasonably
necessary by the government and prohibiting discrimination on racial grounds); see
also Nading, supra note 35, at 772-74 (noting that the protection of property is
mentioned twice in the Declaration of Rights, and that Amendment 16A is in direct
contradiction of these protections of property from arbitrary deprivation).
96. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 23
(invalidating laws that are discriminatory on their face or in effect); see also
Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07, at 13 (finding that although the Declaration of
Rights prohibits discrimination in fact or in effect that Amendments 16A and 16B
are not racially discriminatory because they do not explicitly mention race).
97. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 23
(specifying that a law can still be discriminatory if it does not mention race but is
discriminatory in effect).
98. See id. (providing protection from race-based discrimination); cf. Gabriel
Shumba, International Standards and the 2002 Presidential Election in Zimbabwe,
10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 95, 115 (2003) (claiming that when Zimbabwe’s
government failed to pass a constitutional overhaul through a referendum that
included land reform measures, it launched a racist campaign against white
farmers). But cf. Boyle, supra note 15, at 684 (recounting a speech in which
President Mugabe blamed white farmers for the land crisis in Zimbabwe and
justified violent attacks on their land).
99. See Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 16 (High Ct. Zim.)
(refusing to adhere to the SADC Tribunal decision domestically); cf. Hemel &
Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 521 (finding that despite any obligation to register
the judgment, it is difficult to enforce judgments domestically when the political
will is absent).
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the same facts as the Supreme Court, the SADC Tribunal applied
international principles to find that Amendments 16A and 16B
arbitrarily targeted land in a racially discriminatory way. 100 It noted
that if a law is either passed with a discriminatory intent or if it
disproportionally impacts one race, the law violates antidiscrimination standards.101 The SADC Tribunal accepted
Campbell’s argument that the Zimbabwean government planned to
eradicate white land ownership in Zimbabwe, and passed
Amendments 16A and 16B to accomplish this goal more quickly and
with fewer obstacles from courts.102 As such, the Tribunal correctly
concluded that Amendments 16A and 16B constitute indirect
discrimination.103 By refusing to adopt the SADC Tribunal’s
reasoning, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe is in violation of its
international obligations.104
Lastly, while South African law is not controlling, Zimbabwe
courts regularly look to South African courts for guidance.105 South
100. See Campbell Ltd.v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 2/2007, 52 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty.
Trib. 2008) (refusing to accept an argument that a law is not discriminatory
because it does not mention race on its face).
101. See id. at 45 (asserting that discrimination in any form or nature is
prohibited in international law, and corroborating its claim by citing to general
comments from the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (citation omitted)); see also MAPOSA, supra note 30, at
89 (calling it “quite disturbing” for the government to have so much discretion in
implementing land reform, a politically-charged issue where independent oversight
is particularly important to prevent racially discriminatory practices).
102. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 42 (citing the Petitioner’s brief
which accused the Government of Zimbabwe of using Amendments 16A and 16B
to systematically expropriate white-owned farms).
103. See id. at 50 (quoting the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (citation omitted) who defined indirect discrimination as “a law . . . [that]
does not appear to be discriminatory but has a discriminatory effect when
implemented”).
104. See SADC Treaty, supra note 46, art. 16(5) (granting the Tribunal with the
power to make binding decisions); see also SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY, PROTOCOL ON TRIBUNAL AND THE RULES OF PROCEDURE THEREOF
pt. III, art. 32(3) (2000), available at http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/163
[hereinafter SADC PROTOCOL ON THE TRIBUNAL] (determining that all Tribunal
decisions are to be enforced in the State implicated by the SADC Tribunal’s
decision).
105. Cf. Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 6 (High Ct. Zim.)
(referring to English and South African law to add to the persuasiveness of its
analysis and establish common practice among States); Romero, supra note 39, at
292 (stating that particularly for the Declaration of Rights, which encompasses
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African precedent is especially persuasive on land reform issues, as
the colonial history that led to unequal distribution of land in South
Africa is quite similar to that of Zimbabwe.106 Unlike Zimbabwe’s
Supreme Court, the South African court has held that arbitrary
takings based on race, or without objective criteria, are illegal, and as
such, it has registered the SADC Tribunal’s decision in Campbell.107
This persuasive analysis, in addition to Zimbabwe’s obligation to
adhere to its Declaration of Rights and the SADC Tribunal, reveal
that the Zimbabwean Supreme Court wrongly decided Campbell
under domestic and international law.108

B. AMENDMENTS 16A AND 16B VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
STANDARDS.
In addition to arbitrarily targeting white landowners, Amendments
16A and 16B deny landowners proper notice and a judicial forum to
challenge land seizures, in violation of Article 8 of the UDHR and
Article 7(1)(a) of the Banjul Charter.109 In Campbell, the
Amendments 16A and 16B, Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court often refers to other
Commonwealth courts, including South Africa’s courts).
106. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 15, at 694 (comparing the similar obstacles that
South Africa and Zimbabwe face such as overcoming unequal land distribution,
poverty, and insecurity caused by colonial dispossession); see also Michael Garcia
Bochenek, Compensation for Human Rights Abuses in Zimbabwe, 26 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 483, 496 (1995) (recounting that Zimbabwe’s common law
system is based on South Africa’s, and that it relies heavily on South African law
and other Commonwealth courts for persuasive analysis).
107. See Fick v. Zim., Case No. 01/2010, 2, 4 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2010),
available at http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2010/8.pdf (recognizing that
Zimbabwe is in violation of the SADC Tribunal and taking steps to enforce the
judgment in South Africa); see also Hemel & Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 521
(referring to the single paragraph judgment in which the Court calculated
approximately US$15,5000 in damages for the plaintiffs in Campbell (citation
omitted)). The High Court also attached Zimbabwean government assets in South
Africa to pay the damages. Id. at 521.
108. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 16(1)
(protecting an individual’s right to property, with which the Legislature must
comply when creating laws); see also Fick v. Zim., Case No. 01/2010, 4 (S. Afr.
Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2010) (noting that Zimbabwe has taken no steps to comply with
the SADC Tribunal’s judgment).
109. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art.
16B(3)(a) (denying landowners the ability to challenge acquisitions in court); see
also UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8 (guaranteeing the right to an effective remedy in
a tribunal for violations of individual rights); Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art.
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Zimbabwean Supreme Court incorrectly applied domestic law and
has refused to register the SADC Tribunal judgment that found that
Amendments 16A and 16B do not provide due process.110
1. Amendments 16A and 16B violate the due process guarantees in
Article 8 of the UDHR and Article 7(1) of the Banjul Charter.
Under Amendments 16A and 16B, landowners are able to
judicially challenge the amount of compensation for a taking, but
may not challenge the acquisition itself.111 This restriction violates
the rights enshrined in Article 8 of the UDHR and 7(1) of the Banjul
Charter that protect an individual’s right to have an impartial hearing
by an independent tribunal to have his or her grievance heard.112 The
right to have a fair hearing for grievances is a well-accepted right
across jurisdictions, nations, and cultures.113 Unlike the prohibition
on arbitrary property takings, the right to due process in the UDHR
and the Banjul Charter is not qualified by any other concerns and is
protected under all circumstances.114
7(1)(a) (giving individuals the right to have their cause heard, and to appeal
violations of their fundamental rights in a court); MANBY, supra note 34, at 40
(arguing that Zimbabwe is in violation of fundamental human rights laws by
implementing a policy that is not transparent and denies individuals the right to
appeal decisions).
110. See Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 21 (Zim.)
(limiting its analysis to whether the Legislature complied with procedural
requirements in enacting art. 16B, instead of whether the law denies mandatory
due process rights); see also Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 16
(High Ct. Zim.) (finding that it would be contrary to public policy to register the
SADC Tribunal’s judgment).
111. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art.
16B(3)(a) (denying a judicial remedy for the government’s decision to acquire
land); see also Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1792 (finding that even the
ability to appeal compensation is limited to instances where the court finds that the
Compensation Committee did not act in accordance with lawful principles).
112. See UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8; Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 7(1)(a)
(establishing that every individual has a right to be heard by a competent tribunal);
see also Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1790 (observing that The Land
Acquisition Act, the implementing law for Amendments 16A and 16B, only allows
appeals on compensation and not on the designation of the land for acquisition,
which falls short of legal due process standards).
113. See, e.g., Shriver, supra note 21, at 445 (asserting that the proposition that
due process is mandatory has broad global support).
114. See Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 7(1) (protecting the right of an
individual to have his or her cause heard under all circumstances); see also UDHR,
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Since there is no tribunal that directly interprets the UDHR, its
requirements are best understood through other human rights
tribunals that have looked to the UDHR for analysis.115 The
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has a provision
similar to the UDHR guaranteeing access to court.116 When
interpreting Article 6(1), the European Court has referred to the
UDHR to enlighten its analysis, and has found that every individual
has a fundamental right to access the court in civil matters before an
independent tribunal, and that a state has breached its obligations
when it fails to provide this access.117 This interpretation is consistent
with the argument that Campbell’s right to access the court under the
UHDR was violated by Zimbabwe because Amendment 16B took
away his ability to challenge the taking of his property in a court.118
The African Commission can issue recommendations and resolve
disputes arising under the Banjul Charter.119 The Commission has
interpreted Article 7(1) on numerous occasions and has held that any
law that takes away the jurisdiction of the court in certain instances is
invalid.120 The Commission has recommended that laws that remove
supra note 32, art. 8 (granting every person the right to a remedy for a violation of
that person’s rights).
115. Cf. Joyner, supra note 56, at 591 (emphasizing that the UDHR was not
created to be a document that is directly enforceable, but its contents are still
binding on all nations).
116. See ECHR, Protocol I, supra note 32, art. 6(1) (stating that “[E]veryone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.”).
117. See Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 524, ¶¶ 34-36 (1975)
(relying on the UDHR and Vienna Convention to interpret the ECHR to find that
the right to access the court to bring a civil action is included in Article 6(1)).
118. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art.
16B(3)(a); UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8.
119. See Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 45(1)(b), 3 (granting the
Commission the authority to create principles and legal rules and to interpret the
provisions of the Charter to determine violations).
120. See, e.g., Purohit v. Gam., Commc’n No. 241/2001, ¶¶ 8, 70-72 (Afr.
Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights 2003) (deciding that the Lunatics
Detention Act, which prohibits those detained for mental health reasons from
obtaining legal resources or suing for damages for violations of their rights, is
illegal under Article 7(1)); Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture v. Rwanda,
Commc’n Nos. 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93, ¶ 34 (Afr. Comm’n on Human and
Peoples’ Rights 1996) (holding that expelling refugees from Rwanda, without
providing them the opportunity to be heard, violates Article 7(1)); Civil Liberties
Org. v. Nigeria, Commc’n No. 129/94, ¶¶ 1, 18 (Afr. Comm’n on Human and
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judicial involvement for certain government actions should be struck
down as contrary to Article 7(1).121 Amendment 16B is similar to
laws that the Commission has found to violate Article 7(1) because it
expressly removes judicial access to dispute the legality of
government takings.122
Campbell’s situation exemplifies the manner in which
Amendment 16B strips away landowners’ rights.123 Before
Amendment 16B was passed, Campbell successfully challenged the
government’s designation of his land on two separate occasions.124
After it was passed, he no longer had a cause of action to challenge
the acquisition in court, and after 90 days, his land automatically
reverted to the state.125 Not only does Amendment 16B explicitly
Peoples’ Rights 1995) (agreeing that a law which ousts the jurisdiction of the
courts to interpret laws passed after December 1983 violates Article 7(1) and that a
State is not able to justify the violation of the Charter by claiming that it is
following domestic laws); Civil Liberties Org. v. Nigeria, Commc’n No. 101/93, ¶
1,3, 13 (Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1993) (finding that a law
that prohibits individuals from litigating any issue related to the Nigerian Bar
Association is a violation of Article 7(1)).
121. See, e.g., Purohit, Comm’c No. 241/2001 at ¶¶ 70-72 (asserting that
individuals have a right to access the courts to challenge laws that violate their
rights, in civil and criminal cases); accord Civil Liberties Org., Comm’c No.
129/94 at ¶ 14 (holding that a Nigerian law that prohibits access to the court to
challenge actions taken by the national bar association is contrary to the principles
of the Banjul Charter); see also NMEHIELLE, HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, supra note
69, at 96 (revealing that the Commission’s decisions support an interpretation of
the Charter that include a right to judicial access in the first instance, and on
appeal).
122. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art.
16B(3)(a) (prohibiting landowners from suing before a court to challenge a
government taking); see also Heyns, supra note 66, at 690 (relating that the
Commission has consistently held that laws that oust the jurisdiction of the courts
are invalid under Article 7(1)).
123. See Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 9-13 (Zim.)
(reviewing the facts of Campbell’s case during the years he challenged the
government to prevent his land from being acquired, and then how he was
prevented from future challenges by Amendment 16B).
124. See Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 at 9-10. When Campbell’s land was
designated in 1997, he made a written objection in the administrative body and his
land was unlisted. Id. at 10. In 2001, his land was designated again, and he
protested again. Id. This time, he took his claim to the High Court, which declared
the government’s action invalid. Id.
125. See Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 at 13 (noting that in accordance with
Amendments 16A and 16B, Mount Carmel became state property on the day
Campbell received a preliminary notice that it was to be acquired, which gave him
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forbid access to the courts, the disparity of outcomes under the same
facts and circumstances further illuminates that Amendment 16B
thwarts landowners from pursuing a cause of action that was
previously available.126 In doing so, it allows land to be acquired by
the State that an independent court would otherwise find was
impermissible.127
When Campbell was denied the opportunity to approach the Court
to challenge his eviction, Zimbabwe violated his right under Article
8 of the UDHR and 7(1) of the Banjul Charter.128 In light of the
interpretations of the UDHR and Banjul Charter by tribunals, it is
clear that Campbell’s action was intended to be part of the UDHR
and Banjul Charter’s protection, and that it would be appropriate to
strike down Amendment 16B for its due process violations.
2. Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court is not in compliance with its
Declaration of Rights or the due process standards articulated by the
SADC Tribunal.
In Campbell, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court disregarded its
Declaration of Rights that protects due process.129 The Declaration of
no opportunity to contest the taking in court).
126. CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art. 16B(3)(a);
see Heyns, supra note 66, at 690 (relating that laws that take away the jurisdiction
of the court violate international human rights standards).
127. See Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 at 9-13 (noting that the only change
that occurred between the time a High Court ruled that the taking of Campbell’s
land was invalid in 2001, and when the government acquired his land in 2005, was
the passage of Amendments 16A and 16B); see also Bernadette Atuahene,
Property Rights & the Demands of Transformation, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 765, 77576 (2010) (arguing that fast-track land reform was a hastily conceived program and
its due process violations have caused immeasurable harm to the economy,
Zimbabwe’s international image, and individual stakeholders).
128. UDHR, supra note 32, art. 8; Banjul Charter, supra note 32, art. 7(1)(a).
129. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art.
16(1)(a)-(e) (stating that “No property . . . shall be compulsorily acquired except
under authority of law that . . . requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable
notice . . . requires the acquiring authority to, if the acquisition is contested, to
apply to the High Court . . . enables any person whose property has been acquired
to apply to the High Court or some other court for the prompt return of property if
the court does not confirm the acquisition); see also Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC
49/07, at 15 (asserting that fundamental rights are not immutable and that the
Declaration of Rights does not protect its citizens from its own Constitution when
amendments are passed according to strict procedural requirements).
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Rights requires that landowners receive notice when their land is
targeted for acquisitions, and it gives landowners the opportunity to
challenge land acquisitions based on an argument that the taking was
not “reasonably necessary” to achieve a public purpose.130
Amendment 16B is an impermissible exception to Zimbabwe’s
Declaration of Rights that allows the government to flout usual due
process guarantees for agricultural land redistribution.131 In takings
for land redistribution only, the government does not have to show
the taking was reasonably necessary and does not have to provide
personal notice to landowners.132 No matter the public importance of
land redistribution, it undermines the rule of law to eliminate due
process whenever the public purpose is particularly compelling.133
Instead of recognizing these principles, the Supreme Court agreed
that Amendment 16B ousts judicial review for land acquisitions, but
found that it was legal because it was passed with proper legislative
approval according to prescribed procedures.134 The Court avoided
actually deciding whether Amendment 16B impermissibly interferes
with core due process values by claiming that property acquisitions
are a non-judicial political question, and that when the legislature
makes an unambiguous law regarding this matter, it is beyond the

130. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art.
16(1)(a)-(c) (requiring that acquisitions are reasonably necessary to achieve the
state’s goals, that the landowner get reasonable notice of the government’s intent
to acquire the land, and that the landowner have opportunity to challenge
acquisitions in the High Court of Zimbabwe).
131. Compare id. art. 16B(3)(a), (4) (allowing land to be taken for agricultural
distribution without providing the landowner individual notice or an opportunity to
appeal), with id. art. 16(1) (granting the right for landowners to have notice and a
right to appeal land expropriation on a showing that the expropriation was not
reasonably necessary).
132. Id. art. 16B (specifying that the due process protections of 16(1) do not
apply to the compulsory land acquisitions referred to in 16(2)(a)) .
133. See VAN BANNING, supra note 75, at 179 (explaining that Zimbabwe may
justifiably try to correct land inequalities, but that taking land on a large scale in
violation of human rights standards undermines basic property protection rights
that all individuals should be able to rely upon).
134. See Campbell Ltd. v. Minister of Nat’l Sec., [2008] SC 49/07, 15 (Zim.)
(reciting that the text of the amendments were published in the Zimbabwean
national Gazette thirty days before the amendments were introduced to Parliament,
and that at the final reading in Parliament, the amendments received a two-thirds
vote).
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scope of the court to interfere.135
Not only does this decision contravene the Declaration of Rights,
it contradicts the Supreme Court’s own precedent in Commercial
Farmers’ Union v. Minister of Lands in which it held that taking
private property without notice or a right to challenge the taking
violated due process.136 Strangely, the Supreme Court did not even
refer to this decision, or its mandatory precedential value, in its
Campbell decision.137 By disregarding its own precedent and refusing
to invalidate a law that flouts due process requirements on its face,
the Supreme Court wrongly decided Campbell.138
In addition to these domestic violations, the Supreme Court also
improperly refused to register the SADC Tribunal’s decision in
Gramara.139 The SADC Tribunal correctly applied international
principles and concluded that even if Amendment 16B was passed
legally, it is still subject to judicial review and that individuals must
be allowed to challenge takings in court.140 In Gramara, the High
135. See id. at 28 (commenting that while a general principle is that
Constitutional provisions should not be construed to take away court jurisdiction,
property acquisitions are not judicial questions). It further found that the
unambiguous nature of Amendment 16B leaves no place for judicial interpretation.
Id.
136. See Jeremy Gauntlett, The Lie of the Land: Law and Land Seizure in
Zimbabwe: 1890-2010, Ninth Mofokeng Lecture (Oct. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.cfuzim.org/index.php?view=article&catid=49%3Alandfacts&id=1016%3Alaw-and-land-seizure-in-zimbabwe-18902010&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=89 (quoting the decision in
Commercial Farmers’ Union v. Minister of Lands (citation omitted) that held that
fast-track land redistribution flouted notice and appeal requirements in an
obviously unlawful manner).
137. See generally Campbell Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 (departing from its
precedent in Commercial Farmers’ Union (citation omitted) without ever referring
to the decision). One explanation for the Court’s silence is that it has lost its
political independence. See Dancaescu, supra note 14, at 622, 624 (asserting that
after all but one of the Supreme Court Justices resigned in 2000 because they
feared for their safety, the Court’s independence is in doubt).
138. See Romero, supra note 39, at 294 (finding that although the Zimbabwean
Declaration of Rights expressly protects citizens from deprivation of property, the
government has disregarded this protection in order to carry out its policy goals).
See generally Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007.
139. See Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 16 (High Ct. Zim.)
(declaring that it would be against public policy to register the SADC Tribunal’s
decision).
140. Compare Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 40-41 (holding that since the
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Court declined to recognize the SADC Tribunal’s judgment as a
matter of public policy.141 This was incorrect because, as the SADC
Tribunal held, no public policy or justification excuses denying
landowners basic due process guarantees.142 By refusing to register
this decision, Zimbabwe is in violation of its obligations under the
SADC Tribunal Protocol on the Tribunal that states that all Tribunal
decisions are binding and must be applied domestically in the State
implicated by the judgment.143
C. Amendments 16A and 16B illegally deny landowners
compensation for land that is acquired for redistribution.
Zimbabwe is in violation of the SADC Tribunal’s decision in
Campbell because it has refused to pay adequate compensation to
landowners for acquired land.144 Although Zimbabwe has conceded
that international precepts demand fair compensation to owners, it
has impermissibly denied responsibility to pay landowners whose
land is taken for redistribution.145 When compensation is not
Applicants were expressly denied the opportunity to go to court and seek redress,
their due process rights were violated under the SADC Treaty), with Campbell
Ltd., [2008] SC 49/07 at 28 (claiming that the protection an individual receives in
the use and enjoyment of private property is not a question for the courts, even if
the Legislature essentially gives the individual no due process protection at all).
141. See Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 16 (High Ct. Zim.)
(finding that it is against public policy to register a decision that would require it to
overrule a prior decision by the Supreme Court and invalidate the executive’s fasttrack land reform policy).
142. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 56 (reciting the proposition that
national law or policy cannot be relied upon to avoid international law
obligations); see also Shriver, supra note 21, at 445 (asserting that customary
international law requires due process in all circumstances).
143. See SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 104, pt. III, art. 32(3)
(“Decisions of the Tribunal shall be binding upon the parties to the dispute in
respect of that particular case and enforceable within the territories of the States
concerned.”).
144. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 56 (claiming that it is impermissible
for Zimbabwe to rely on Amendment 16A to avoid its international law obligation
to pay compensation); cf. Dancaescu, supra note 14, at 641 (arguing that when a
government takes private property without compensation, such action indicates
that the government is dangerous, anti-democratic, and corrupt).
145. See CONST. OF ZIM. of 1979 (as amended by Act No. 5 of 2005), art.
16A(1)(c)(ii) (asserting that even if Great Britain refuses to pay landowners,
Zimbabwe still has no right to pay compensation); see also Campbell Ltd., Case
No. 2/2007 at 54-55 (focusing on the fact that in Zimbabwe’s arguments before the
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guaranteed, it undermines the entire land redistribution program by
breeding anger about unfair deprivation and uncertainty about
legitimate ownership.146
While the SADC Tribunal has not had the opportunity to develop
jurisprudence on this issue, its decision aligns with other human
rights documents and secondary sources. The American Convention
on Human Rights explicitly requires just compensation to
accompany expropriations.147 The American Restatement on Foreign
Relations also demands “adequate, effective, and prompt” payment
for land expropriated by a government.148 Applying these principles
and Zimbabwe’s own concession that international precepts demand
compensation, the SADC Tribunal appropriately found that
Amendment 16A violates this right to compensation.149
After determining that compensation is required, the Tribunal was
not convinced that Amendment 16A’s compensation clause is an
effective or meaningful way to provide compensation. By deflecting
responsibility to Great Britain, which has not agreed to pay
landowners for taken property, no compensation is provided at all.150
Tribunal, it never disputed that Applicants are entitled to compensation, but rather,
who should pay it); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
712(1)(c) (1987) (calling it a violation of international law when a taking is not
accompanied by just compensation).
146. See MAPOSA, supra note 30, at 88 (determining that non-compensation
both undermines the rule of law and produces doubt in the people that its
government is committed to justice).
147. See American Convention, supra note 32, art. 21(2) (“No one shall be
deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of
public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms
established by law.”); see also Shriver supra note 21, at 450-51 (arguing that
adequate compensation near market value is required under international law, and
while the United Nations and Restatement of Foreign Relations may introduce the
idea of less than market value, tribunals have ignored this approach in practice).
148. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 145, §
712(1)(c) (stating that “A state is responsible under international law for injury
resulting from a taking by the state . . . that . . . is not accompanied by provision for
just compensation.”); see also Hellum & Derman, supra note 27 (claiming that
compensation for expropriation is an established international law principle).
149. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 54-55 (emphasizing that in
Zimbabwe’s arguments before the Tribunal, it never denied that Applicants are
entitled to compensation).
150. See id. at 56 (noting that Zimbabwe is using Amendment 16A to avoid
paying the petitioners, even though they have a clear legal title, thus preventing the
petitioners from receiving any meaningful compensation); accord Shriver, supra
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Because Amendment 16A effectively denies compensation, the
SADC Tribunal appropriately directed Zimbabwe to pay landowners
who had been denied compensation.151 Zimbabwe is in breach of its
SADC obligations by continuing to refuse to pay fair compensation
to any landowners whose land has been taken.152

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
To account for the human rights violations to property and due
process, Zimbabwe must make major changes to its laws and provide
redress for the victims who have already suffered.153 If it fails to do
so, the international community must step in as best as it can to
legally protect victims of Zimbabwe’s fast-track land reform
program.154
note 21, at 450 (asserting that Zimbabwe may be able to pay less than fair market
value for land, but not paying for the land at all is not justified).
151. See Campbell Ltd., Case No. 2/2007 at 58 (directing Zimbabwe to pay fair
compensation, before June 2009, to the petitioners whose land had already been
taken).
152. See Fick v. Zimbabwe, Case No. 01/2010, 2 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib.
2010) (noting that instead of compensating landowners as the SADC Tribunal
ordered, Zimbabwe has endangered the lives and property of those who its
decision was meant to protect); cf. SADC Protocol on Tribunal, supra note 104, pt.
III, art. 32(3) (mandating the SADC Tribunal make binding decisions that are to be
enforced within the territory of the State concerned).
153. See Nading, supra note 35, at 798-800 (advising Zimbabwe to stop
appropriating white-owned farms, and stop antagonizing the commercial farmers
who still form a crucial part of the economy).
154. See Boyle, supra note 15, at 693 (detailing the United States, Great Britain,
and International Monetary Fund’s decision to terminate aid to Zimbabwe because
of perceived violence related to resettlement). In addition to political and
diplomatic efforts like ending aid or imposing sanctions, international, regional,
and foreign courts should continue to provide a forum for farmers whose land has
been expropriated. These courts include, but are not limited to, the SADC
Tribunal, South African Courts, and United States courts. See Campbell Ltd., Case
No. 2/2007 at 24-25 (granting jurisdiction to hear individual claims based on
human rights violations and denial of due process, and to develop jurisprudence
using applicable treaties and general principles of international law); Hemel &
Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 521 (reviewing South African courts’ willingness to
register judgments against Zimbabwe); Luke Peterson, Tribunal orders Zimbabwe
to Pay £7.3 Million to Dutch Farmers, NEW ZIMBABWE (Apr. 28, 2009),
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/farm91.19740.html (reviewing a decision by
the World Bank's International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes which
found that Zimbabwe’s land evictions violated treaty obligations); Peter
Matambanadzo, Dutch Farmers Seek Compensation, ALLAFRICA.COM (Oct. 21,
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A. THE ZIMBABWE SUPREME COURT CAN CONFORM TO ITS SADC
OBLIGATIONS BY REGISTERING THE SADC TRIBUNAL’S JUDGMENT
DOMESTICALLY.
Zimbabwe’s Supreme Court should register the SADC Tribunal’s
decision.155 Although the court in Gramara held that Zimbabwe
would not register the decision, Gramara was decided by
Zimbabwe’s High Court.156 If a challenge is brought before the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court should decline to
follow Gramara’s faulty reasoning and recognize the validity of the
SADC Tribunal’s judgment.157 Since such a decision would likely
contradict the Zimbabwean Supreme Court’s Campbell decision, the
likelihood of this is remote.158 Application of the SADC Tribunal’s
Campbell decision is, however, required in order for Zimbabwe to
conform to its international legal obligations.159

2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201010210293.html (reporting that farmers have
approached the U.S. District Court of New York to attach Zimbabwean assets in
the United States to compensate farmers for expropriated land).
155. See Fick v. Republic of Zim., Case No. 01/2010, 2, 4 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty.
Trib. 2010) (reminding Zimbabwe that the SADC Tribunal’s decision in Campbell
Ltd. (citation omitted) is binding and enforceable in Zimbabwe territory and
admonishing Zimbabwe for not complying with the decision, and referring the
matter to the SADC for appropriate action).
156. See Gramara Ltd. v. Zimbabwe, [2010] HC 33/09, 16 (High Ct. Zim.)
(deciding not to register the SADC’s Tribunal judgment).
157. Practically, this seems unlikely, particularly considering the composition of
the court. See Dancaescu, supra note 14, at 638 (questioning the independence of
Zimbabwe’s judiciary).
158. The SADC Tribunal has now released two decisions noting that Zimbabwe
has failed to comply with the Tribunal’s judgment in Campbell Ltd. (citation
omitted) and meet its obligations under international law. See Fick v. Zimbabwe,
Case No. 01/2010, 4 (S. Afr. Dev. Cmty. Trib. 2010) (reviewing its 2009 decision
that Zimbabwe had not complied with its judgment in Campbell Ltd. (citation
omitted), and finding that non-compliance was continuing). Zimbabwe’s failure to
comply with the SADC Tribunal signals that it will continue to ignore its
obligation to register the judgment.
159. See discussion, supra Part II (arguing that Zimbabwe is in violation of
international law for failure to protect the rights of landowners to hold property
free from arbitrary takings, to have their due process rights upheld, and to receive
compensation when such property is seized).
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B. ZIMBABWE SHOULD REPEAL AMENDMENTS 16A AND 16B AND
ADOPT A NEW LAND REFORM LAW THROUGH A CONSTITUTIONAL
REFERENDUM.

In a more likely scenario, the Supreme Court will not register the
SADC Tribunal judgment or even consider another challenge. 160
However, Zimbabwe is currently undergoing a constitutional reform
process, and land reform continues to be a pressing concern.161 The
major opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change, is urging
changes to the land reform law and has complained that fast-track
land reform is exploitive, unfair, and illegal.162 The Commercial
Farmers’ Union also advocates for major constitutional reform.163
The constitutional reform process should be a stakeholder-driven
process that receives input from the potential beneficiaries of land
and those whose land may be affected.164 It should focus on
providing more transparency and protection for current owners while
respecting the right of landless Zimbabweans to have access to
property.165

160. This assessment is based on Zimbabwe’s failure to address the issue in the
Supreme Court since the SADC Tribunal originally decided Campbell Ltd. in
2007.
161. See Lloyd Msipa, Land and the New Zimbabwe Constitution, LLOYD
MSIPA: POLITICS & LAW (May 27, 2010) http://msipa.blogspot.com/2010/05/landand-new-constitution-lloyd-msipa.html (proposing replacement provisions for
Amendment 16B that are less controversial while still addressing the necessity of
redistribution).
162. See Land and Agriculture, MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE, (Nov.
22, 2009), http://www.mdc.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content& view=article
&id=133&Itemid=124 (promising that if elected, the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) party would ensure that land reform would stop benefiting
government officials and cronies, that it would conduct an audit of current land
redistribution, and that it would form a Commission to investigate corrupt
practices); see also Rutherford, supra note 1, at 111 (noting that the MDC
considers fast-track resettlement a violation of property rights).
163. See INTRODUCTION TO THE AGRICULTURAL RECOVERY PROPOSAL, ARAC,
(2010), http://www.cfuzim.org/images/arpintro.pdf (last visited Sep. 25, 2011)
(demanding that constitutional change is necessary for agricultural recovery, as is a
Land Commission to investigate the land reform program).
164. See Rutherford, supra note 1, at 111 (observing that such a process would
be in the interests of civil society, opposition groups, and government technocrats).
165. See MANBY, supra note 34, at 43 (asserting that change must occur to
protect poor Zimbabweans who are suffering the most under fast-track land reform
and who have the fewest options to obtain recourse).
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Because of the devastating social and economic impact that the
fast-track law has had on Zimbabwe, Amendments 16A and 16B
should be repealed.166 A new law should call for an immediate end to
expropriations and establish a commission to resolve and investigate
potential human rights abuses since 2000 or earlier.167 Under a new
law, land redistribution must continue.168 Land redistribution, legally
implemented, is essential to post-colonial nations and to economic
recovery in Zimbabwe, but it must be done in a way that will diffuse
tensions and ensure compliance with international law.169
A new law should be based on a willing buyer, willing seller
method with the right of first refusal to the government.170
Admittedly, this type of negotiated land reform is slower than land
expropriations, particularly the fast-track expropriations that are
currently being done.171 However, a somewhat slower process will
strike a fair balance between meeting Zimbabwe’s land reform goals
in a timely manner and avoiding violations of basic human rights.172
166. See id. (advocating for the immediate cessation of fast-track land reform).
167. Cf. Romero, supra note 39, at 296 (proposing the creation of a truth and
justice commission to investigate human rights abuses related to property
deprivation).
168. See Todd Moss, Zimbabwe’s Meltdown, 31 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 133,
141 (2007) (asserting that despite the controversies surrounding Zimbabwe’s
tactics, no one denies how important it is for a fair land distribution process to be
completed); see also Kevin E. Colby, Brazil and the MST: Land Reform and
Human Rights, 15 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 18 (2003) (asserting that the lack of a land
reform program could also be a human rights violation).
169. See Atuahene, supra note 127, at 778-79 (explaining that redistribution
gives land to people who were unjustifiably dispossessed under racist colonial
practices, which makes land reform an essential ingredient to recovery).
170. See Shriver, supra note 21, at 429 (explaining that the right of first refusal
requires anyone who wishes to sell their land to offer it first to the government,
which can either buy the land or allow it to be placed on the private market).
171. But see Rutherford, supra note 1, at 105 (revealing that although
proponents claim that fast-track reform is the most efficient way to conduct land
reform, the results do not match the rhetoric). Five years into fast-track reform,
almost 6,000 farms were acquired by the government in an expeditious manner,
but eighty-six percent of those farms had yet to be confirmed or actually given to
beneficiaries. Id. Cf. VAN BANNING, supra note 75, at 333 (arguing that quick
radical approaches to land reform are bound to fail and likely to lead to human
rights violations).
172. Cf. Shriver, supra note 21, at 454-55 (comparing Zimbabwe’s land reform
issues to Namibia, remarking that while Namibia’s slow land reform process may
present frustrations, more hasty land reform measures would potentially result in
human rights violations similar to those in Zimbabwe).
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1. South Africa should be used as a model for land reform
legislation.
South Africa has approached land reform from a few different
angles.173 This includes the willing buyer, willing seller market-based
approach to redistribution, land restitution, and strengthening tenure
security.174 South Africa’s land reform law has met some of the same
frustrations as Zimbabwe in terms of slow progression.175 However,
its government has accepted that slowness is a price that must be
paid to ensure rule of law.176 South Africa is an appropriate model for
Zimbabwe because the two states are regionally proximate, have
similar colonial histories, and traditionally rely on one another for
judicial guidance.177 While Zimbabwe should focus on negotiated
land reform through the willing buyer, willing seller, it would also be
useful to consider measures to strengthen tenure security for land
occupants that do not have proper titles.178
If expropriation continues in Zimbabwe, it must actually distribute
land to the landless.179 By some estimates, more people have been
173. See Atuahene, supra note 127, at 784-95 (exploring South Africa’s land
restitution, eminent domain, tenure security, and negotiated land reform strategies).
174. See Boyle, supra note 15, at 678-80 (separating South Africa’s land reform
into three prongs that consist of restitution, redistribution, and land tenure). But
see Claxton, supra note 1, at 549 (opining that a market-based model limits the
scale of land redistribution and prevents true reform).
175. See Carson, supra note 84, at 414-15 (complaining that negotiated land
reform can slow reform efforts by inflating prices and leaving the buyer with fewer
resources post-purchase). In some cases, this concern can be resolved by grants or
loans given by the government or international community. See also BINSWANGERMKHIZE, supra note 22, at 21 (comparing programs where the government was the
buyer to programs where individuals were able to buy land directly from the
owner).
176. See Boyle, supra note 15, at 695 (referring to the South African
Government’s assertion that it would never tolerate the same type of violence and
uncertainty that has occurred in Zimbabwe).
177. See Sarah E. Hager, Zimbabwe: Why the United Nations, State, and NonState Actors Failed to Effectively Regulate Mugabe’s Policy of Internal
Displacement, 37 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 221, 253-54 (2007) (reviewing the extensive
similarities between Zimbabwe and South Africa, from their colonial histories, to
their economic and trading ties).
178. See BINSWANGER-MKHIZE, supra note 22, at 398 (assessing the benefits of
tenure security to increase investor confidence, reduce conflict, and provide a
transparent legal framework to assess ownership).
179. See, e.g., Kinsey, supra note 23, at 178 (providing evidence that much of
the acquired land has been given to high-ranking government officials).
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displaced by Zimbabwe’s fast-track program than have been
resettled.180 Because the fast-track program has been effective in
expropriating land, but less so in fair redistribution to the landless, a
new law that allows expropriation should be crafted to require more
oversight for land authorities and stricter penalties for fraud or
misuse of position.181
Additionally, if expropriations do continue in Zimbabwe, South
Africa should be the model.182 While South Africa has not avoided
all the problems of Zimbabwe, it has engaged in thoughtful land
redistribution that addresses the valid needs of its dispossessed
citizens while complying with international law.183 This includes fair
notice, compensation, and access to challenge acquisitions in
court.184 These three components are crucial elements to any
expropriation law and are necessary to meet UDHR and Banjul
Charter standards.185

180. See Hellum & Derman, supra note 27, at 1800 (considering the vast
numbers of farm workers who have lost their jobs and been displaced because of
land reform measures); see also Romero, supra note 39, at 275 (commenting that
Operation Murambatsvina, which was a program designed to clean-up the cities in
Zimbabwe, has displaced over 700,000 people who lived in informal housing).
Many of these people were in informal housing after being collaterally displaced
during land reform efforts. Id. at 279.
181. See MANBY, supra note 34, at 30 (criticizing the fast-track program for not
providing proper oversight or a transparent process); cf. Claxton, supra note 1, at
550 (suggesting that one way to lesson conflict in expropriations is to target
absentee owners who have fewer stakes in the land).
182. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 25(2)-(3) (subjecting property expropriations
to procedural limitations that include non-arbitrariness, just and equitable
compensation, and access to courts to confirm the fairness of compensation); cf.
Dancaescu, supra note 14, at 641 (recommending that South Africa be influential
in resolving Zimbabwe’s land reform crisis).
183. See Boyle, supra note 15, at 696 (complimenting the cautious approach that
South Africa has taken to land reform which has allowed it to avoid politicallymotivated violence or a disregard for the rule of law).
184. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 145,
at § 712(1)-(3) (asserting that international law demands that States pay
compensation for acquisitions, provide a forum to challenge acquisitions, and not
take land in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner.
185. See Mielnik, supra note 60, at 617-18 (explaining that the three basic
elements for expropriation to be considered fair are public purpose, nondiscriminatory implementation, and compensation).
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C. INDIVIDUALS SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK LEGAL REDRESS FOR
ZIMBABWE’S VIOLATIONS OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS BY
APPROACHING FOREIGN, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS.
In the alternative, in which Zimbabwe does not reform its law, the
SADC Tribunal should continue to be used by commercial farmers to
vindicate their rights.186 As South Africa has demonstrated by
registering the SADC Tribunal’s decision domestically, States other
than Zimbabwe may take steps to provide damages to landowners.187
Plaintiffs may also approach other courts besides the SADC Tribunal
and South African courts.188 In fact, some victims of Zimbabwe’s
land reform have already attempted to approach U.S. courts to obtain
judgments against Zimbabwe.189 Creative use of different fora is not
an ideal way to provide redress for victims, but until Zimbabwe
adopts measures to reform its law, it may be the most practical
remedy for landowners.190

CONCLUSION
Amendments 16A and 16B fall short of the basic human rights
standards articulated in the UDHR and Banjul Charter that

186. See Hemel & Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 518 (praising the activeness of
the tribunal in enforcing human rights standards and its usefulness for future
litigation).
187. See Steve Hofstatter, SADC’s Zimbabwe Property Ruling Enforced in SA,
BUSINESS DAY (Feb. 26, 2010, 7:10 AM), http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/
Content.aspx?id=94802 (reporting that the South African judiciary determined that
the SADC Tribunal’s ruling against Zimbabwe is enforceable in South Africa).
188. See Matambanadzo, supra note 154 (reporting that even in the United
States, commercial farmers whose land was confiscated in Zimbabwe are
approaching the courts to recover some damages for their lost property). While
these farmers are relying on the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the
SADC Tribunal’s decision may be used as a reference to prove the propriety of
awarding a judgment in favor of the farmers. Cf. id. (stating that the farmers want
the judgment to be made in accordance with the U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act).
189. See id. (reporting on thirteen Dutch nationals who have filed an application
in District Court in New York for compensation for their confiscated farms).
190. See Hemel & Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 522 (praising the SADC
Tribunal and South African courts for taking measures to attach Zimbabwe’s assets
to enforce awards).
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Zimbabwe is obligated to follow.191 In addition, Zimbabwe is in
violation of its obligations to the SADC Tribunal’s decision by
refusing to register the Tribunal’s judgment that Amendments 16A
and 16B are arbitrary, do not provide due process, and do not provide
compensation to owners.192
In addition to the legal violations, Amendments 16A and 16B are a
detriment to Zimbabwe and its people.193 Its economic collapse and
flagrant human rights violations have led many to label Zimbabwe as
a state in crisis.194 While much of the harm stemming from this fasttrack land reform has done irreparable damage, a change in policy
and the cessation of fast-track land reform would be notable and
would encourage steps towards returning the rule of law to
Zimbabwe.195 In the meantime, it is up to international tribunals like
the SADC Tribunal and foreign states to condemn fast-track land
reform and provide a forum for victims to access legal remedies.196

191. See discussion, supra Part II (discussing Zimbabwe’s violations of the
protection to property, the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation, and the right to
due process of law).
192. See discussion, supra Part II (arguing that Zimbabwe must comply with the
decision of the SADC Tribunal, in accordance with its obligations under the SADC
Treaty, which it has ratified).
193. See VAN BANNING, supra note 75, at 179 (observing that Zimbabwe’s land
reform has undermined its social fabric, isolated it in the international community,
and discouraged investment into the economy).
194. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 4, at 590 (providing readers with an
overview of the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe stemming from land
reform).
195. See, e.g., MANBY, supra note 34, at 43 (referring to a conference in which
civil society groups agreed that fast-track land reform must end to bring the rule of
law back to Zimbabwe).
196. See Hemel & Schalkwyk, supra note 47, at 523 (encouraging the use of the
SADC Tribunal, with the cooperation of national courts, to tackle human rights
abuses in Zimbabwe).

